



**LINKING RELIEF, REHABILITATION AND
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (LRRD)
IN AFGHANISTAN**

IS BUILDING A CITY AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE TO
DEVELOPMENT ISSUES IN BAMİYAN?

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Apart from the destruction of the two 1600 year old giant Buddhas by the Taliban in 2001, Bamiyan is both experiencing tremendous changes and facing complex issues regarding its evolution. At this point of time, it seems important to reflect on and question the orientation of this expanding development, as well as its likely effects from a field work perspective.

Located in Hazarajat, central Highlands, Bamiyan “city”, 120km north-west of Kabul, is the capital of Bamiyan province and is composed of five districts¹. Bamiyan is also a valley, sandwiched between two high mountain ranges. This area is probably one of the most monoethnic regions of Afghanistan.

Unlike the rest of the Afghan population, the Hazara people, the third largest ethnic group in the country, are Shiite. This difference is central to their political and socio-economic marginalisation. Early in the 20th century, Hazara slave markets still existed. Even before the war in the 1960s, the scope of development in Bamiyan lagged significantly behind the other provinces. According to many Hazara people, ethnic discrimination lies at the heart of slow development in this province.

After 25 years of war, almost all the inhabitants of Bamiyan city can be considered IDPs (Internally Displaced People). Indeed from the Soviet attack to the withdrawal of the Taliban in 2001, the population of Bamiyan has been forced to flee several times. As a result most of the houses have suffered repeated damage, livestock and crops have been confiscated, especially during the Taliban period, who massacred large numbers of Hazara people just because they were Hazara.

One of the first difficulties encountered on conducting this study was identifying the limits of what is known as Bamiyan city. As a matter of fact, Bamiyan city does not officially exist: there are no official boundaries. Bamiyan city is defined by all the inhabitants and local stakeholders as a rural area, or at least as a mix between urban and rural. The concept of city has no clear signification for the population, or if it does they reduce it to the bazaar. Nevertheless, after consultation with the various local stakeholders, and the field visit, the twelve closest villages to the bazaar area (less than 20 minutes by car) have been selected as part of Bamiyan city. These villages are strongly connected to the economy of the bazaar. Yet, for the other villages located in remote areas (up to 1.5 hours from the bazaar), Bamiyan bazaar is also an important economic hub but their remote location and the lack of infrastructure prevents us from considering them as part of Bamiyan city. Hence, in the following report, Bamiyan city will refer to the bazaar and its twelve closest villages².

This study seeks to address the relevance of designing a master plan for Bamiyan’s future development. The study highlights the difficulty of striking a balance between the need to cope with urgent livelihood issues and promote sustainable development. The situation in Bamiyan today illustrates all too well new linkages between rural and urban contexts. Evidently building a city conjures up a dream of modernity, a desire to reach higher degrees of development. Nevertheless the question remains as to whether building a city is the most appropriate response to enhancing livelihoods in Bamiyan? Furthermore how can development plans both preserve historical and cultural areas whilst also allowing for much needed economic development? Does Bamiyan still require an emergency approach or should the transfer over to a development approach be taking place?

¹ Yakawlang, Panjab, Waras, Shibar and Bamiyan

² Cf. Figure 1

This analysis is based on a two-phase survey and field research conducted between July and October 2005³.

What is at stake today in Bamiyan?

The major development issues facing Bamiyan city include both uncontrolled expansion of villages as well as weak urban management or lack of infrastructure as outlined below.

First, the rapid population growth is the result of different factors. Good security levels in the Bamiyan area, the development of the bazaar, the presence of many NGOs and government offices have attracted many IDPs looking for a place to live after 25 years of war and forced movement. Afghanistan also has to deal with the return of more than two million refugees who fled abroad during the war. Refugees from Pakistan and Iran have moved back⁴ to Bamiyan, sometimes after twenty years abroad.

Then, the development of the bazaar constitutes a threat for the historical and cultural zones of Bamiyan. Indeed Bamiyan city has one focal point: a bazaar comprising approximately 1000 small shops. This bazaar is located in the valley and forms a street parallel to the holes left by the Buddhas in the mountains. Around the bazaar there are no houses, as people are living in different villages around the bazaar. Nevertheless some infrastructure is based around the bazaar, such as the boy's high school, the hospital and the university. The bazaar has undergone huge development since 2002 when there were only around 50 shops. Every day it attracts more daily workers, especially newcomers without land and as a result, it gets bigger. The main problem remains that this uncontrolled expansion is taking place to the detriment of agricultural fields and archaeological and cultural areas identified by UNESCO. This is why UNESCO has proposed a plan for managing and preserving cultural areas in Bamiyan. Indeed, UNESCO is now advocating that the development of the bazaar be frozen.

Another striking aspect is the development of poor and new villages, exclusively linked to an already saturated bazaar. All the newcomers are de facto landless since there is no more agricultural land available today in the Bamiyan area. They have no choice but to seek job opportunities in the bazaar. Yet, the bazaar is experiencing difficulties in absorbing these new workers. As a result the newcomers are experiencing considerable difficulties earning regular incomes, and therefore cannot afford decent accommodation. Three new villages⁵ have been created since 2002 and give the best illustration of the changes that Bamiyan city is experiencing today. The first village, Zargaran is totally illegal. It is situated on the mountainside between Daudi and Jugra Khil⁶ and it owes its existence to the illegal selling off of land by the mayor. Indeed the mayor regularly sells land belonging to the Daudi and Jugra Khil people. This new village has undergone the most rapid growth since the majority of newcomers settle here. The creation of this village has resulted in major land disputes. Indeed the land that is now occupied by the newcomers is where people from Daudi and Jugra Khil used to access the *ailocks* with their livestock. There is no infrastructure in this village and it is probably the poorest of the valley. Many families are landless, they work as daily workers in the bazaar, but as the labour market of the bazaar is increasingly saturated the majority are jobless.

Two other villages, Mollah Ghollum and Shang Chespan, have been officially created by the former governor and their development was supported by local NGOs⁷ in 2003. At first the

⁴ 5,161 refugees since 2002 (15-20% remain in Iran and Pakistan), 31,000 IDPs since 2002 (most of them are back).

⁵ Shang Chespan, Zargaran, Mollah Ghollum

⁶ Two other villages are located on the east mountainside.

⁷ CAWC and Shuada

purpose of these villages was to provide accommodation to people living in caves around the giant Buddhas. In Mollah Ghollum, located few kilometres away from the Buddhas on the west road, half of the 80 houses were built by NGOs and were given to people working for the government and to 'friends' of the former governor. In Chang Shespan, the distribution of the 100 houses was a little more official and it appears that cave dwellers were indeed among the beneficiaries. The origin of the problem is that this village was built on a small plateau and no water network was planned. Indeed, there is no water at all in this area. As a result some of the beneficiaries preferred to sell their houses and returned to living in the caves they occupied before, where they had easier access to water.

Local authorities were completely responsible for building these two villages: all the houses look alike. They have the specificity of being built and designed according to a plan.

In these three new villages people are landless and have no livestock. They have no link with rural activities. Except Mollah Ghollum, where a large proportion of people working for the government or teachers live, these villages are totally linked to the economy of the bazaar.

As a result, one of the key issues remains the shortage of land. This issue underlines the problem of catering for newcomers who have to deal with the unofficial land distribution policy or simply the lack of land policy. Political tensions between the governor and the mayor are also part of the problem. The mayor keeps on selling land in mountainside area whereas it is forbidden. Moreover there is no more available land in all the valley, currently the governor is seeking new available land in Yakawlang to shelter the newcomers who are now living in the caves.

On top of that, in every village visited people highlighted the fact that access to water is the top priority. Rural villages are experiencing difficulties in irrigating their land. Poor villages located in the northern part of the mountainside do not have access to drinking water. Originally, some of these people were living in caves, some are still living in this type of accommodation, but many one-room mud houses have been built over the last few years. People are either working as daily workers in the fields or in the bazaar, or both. The majority of the population is composed of very small landowners. Their plot of land barely produces enough for them to eat during the winter season. Many of the IDPs who have returned to these villages are jobless or daily workers in the bazaar.

Several wells have been built in different villages but most of the time they are not functioning. During spring and summer, people take water from rivers and streams but they are heavily polluted. During winter time, access to water is even more difficult since streams are dry and people have to go further to get water, sometime more than two hours walk. Not every family has a donkey.

Finally, the lack of infrastructure, including roads, sanitation, electricity and schools, remains the ultimate issue. The road between Bamiyan and Kabul is really bad, it takes eight hours to reach Kabul, and for the trucks it is even longer and dangerous. During winter, most of the roads are closed. Bamiyan remains a very remote area. No electricity network has been built. Only the richest villages have been able to buy a generator. Likewise there is no sanitation system. When it comes to school, the large majority of the parents are willing to send their children to school. There is one boy's high school in the centre of Bamiyan and one girl's high school in Saidabad. Whereas the boy's high school have a very central location, the girl's school is less ideal. Consequently villagers who are living in remote villages are reluctant to send their girls to school since the journey takes anything up to two hours.

Regarding the quality of the infrastructure network, Bamiyan evidently still has a long way to go before it can fully be identified as a city, if one considers that a city can be defined by its ability to offer a services network to its inhabitants.

Since 2001: a new rural/urban interface

Some of the issues raised above are new and the direct result of 25 years of war. Indeed before the war, livelihoods of Bamiyan inhabitants were better because they were largely based on agriculture and livestock. However, all cattle owners lost their livestock during the war. Finally, the main effect of the war has been a severe impoverishment of the population. Indeed, only big landowners have the ability to invest in new activities. These people are living in the southern area of the valley which can be described as the wealthier area. The five villages⁸ located in the southern area of the valley are surrounded by fields and have the significant advantage of having access to both drinking and irrigation water. These villages are inhabited by big landowners (up to 20 jeribs) and they are the wealthiest since they have the capacity to invest the profits generated from the land in new commercial activities in the bazaar. The southern area is also considered as the richest since this is where UN organisations, NGOs, government offices and guest houses are located. As a result, part of the population living there works for them. Taking advantage of higher salaries in comparison to the average Afghan income these people also invest their money in commercial activities in the bazaar. All the shopkeepers live in these villages. It is only in these rich villages that livestock can be found. Here, before the war one could find huge herds of livestock, but people lost their livestock during the war and drought. Since then, very few people have chosen to reinvest in this activity. Households tend to own just few sheep or cows for their own use.

Inhabitants of the villages identified as part of Bamiyan city are investing their capital in new sectors and are specialising in what is perceived as 'modern' activities. There are several elements which explain why animal husbandry is on the decline. First, many people have not forgotten the traumas of the war and this continues to determine their livelihoods. People are still afraid that the Taliban may return. If they do not reinvest in livestock, it is because they are afraid of losing it again. They would rather invest in activities that they perceive as being less fragile. It is obvious to them that people who had shops before the war still have their shop and are able to make a good living from it today. On the other hand, people who had a lot of livestock before the war have lost everything and are unable to rebuild their wealth. Another reason is that the current system of micro-credit⁹ is not suitable for investing in livestock. Hence, it is easier to get credit to invest in small businesses (shop, car, petrol station) than in livestock due to the terms of credit: villagers have to pay back two months after they have received the loan, yet two months is not enough time to make any profit from livestock. A third and last reason is the change in mentality. People are attracted to what they perceive as modern that is to say in Bamiyan commercial activities: setting up a shop, buying a car, etc. Likewise livestock requires long term investment and hard work whereas new businesses such as shops and cars can generate decent amounts of money quickly. They are the symbol of a modern world and of a successful life in the eyes of a population who has suffered from 25 years of war. Indeed, it is worth raising the question whether in the long run the bazaar economy is going to overtake agriculture economy?

This mix between commercial and agricultural activities highlights the need to develop new ways of understanding the rural-urban interface and thus the true reality of Bamiyan today. Using a conventional or Western analysis in order to understand the differences between rural and urban areas may give rise to gross misunderstandings with regard to the Bamiyan reality. The categories used for defining cities and rural areas are no longer applicable. Indeed Bamiyan offers a very specific example of a new rural-urban linkage. It is still difficult to determine whether Bamiyan bazaar and its villages can truly be called a city. Bamiyan is in

⁸ Sadaibad, Sarasyab, Hyderabad, Dasht Essan Khan, Gorwana

⁹ In Bamiyan two NGOs, CHF and AKDN, provide loans to people in order to help them to develop income generating activities.

a transitional phase: it is no longer solely rural but it is not yet a city. Many people's livelihoods are still based on agriculture although since the end of the war, they have shifted towards the growing economy of the bazaar.

What type of development is most applicable for Bamiyan city? How to preserve historical and cultural areas and promote economic development?

UNESCO has produced a management and conservation plan for archaeological and cultural areas in Bamiyan. The aim of this plan is to put forward recommendations for the future development of these areas. That is to say identifying areas to preserve and others where development could be carried out. UNESCO's objective was not to build a city but only preserve archaeological and cultural areas. Nevertheless the governor of Bamiyan took this plan as an opportunity to develop a master plan to build what she calls a "new city" on the plateau south of Bamiyan. The aim of this master plan is to attract private investment, to receive financial resources from central government according to an agenda based on Bamiyan needs fixed by the master plan and, finally to preserve the archaeological and historical zones (on UNESCO recommendations) by focusing all the investments in one area (on the plateau in the south) far away from the main cultural areas identified by UNESCO.

Protecting Bamiyan's historical values is a top priority for the governor to prevent any further deterioration. It is also essential for Bamiyan's future development. Indeed Bamiyan has a huge tourist potential. This has already started, for example, now one has to pay a ticket to visit the Buddha holes. One solution for Bamiyan "city" development could be the development of tourism. This being said, the importance of finding a balance between preserving the cultural landscape and economic development is even greater.

The need today is to produce a plan that will combine cultural and archaeological conservation and the right of Bamiyan inhabitants to have access to proper economic development. Yet a master plan needs a long-term development outlook whereas the conservation of cultural and archaeological heritage requires short-term action.

Building a city: a dream of modernity

What is obvious today is the need for Bamiyan to establish a plan in order to manage its uncontrolled expansion and development. This is necessary in order to preserve its cultural landscape as well as to provide decent accommodation and infrastructure to the inhabitants of the area. Yet is the building of a city the appropriate response, as the local authorities seem to think?

First, one should address the fact that the master plan proposed by the governor seems to be quite detached from Bamiyan's realities and problems. There is a real gap between development priorities, perceptions of the villagers and the choice made by the local authorities. The local authorities want to build a totally new area on the plateau. No consultation process with the local population has been conducted. What the population wanted has not been listened to, in fact no-one even bothered to ask them: as a result the shopkeepers in the bazaar claim they would refuse to leave or to move if a new commercial area was created in the plateau. On top of this, the master plan is focusing only on one zone: the plateau which is already one of the richest of the area. Why not first develop the area where the poorest villages are situated since they are the ones who most urgently need infrastructure? The master plan does not tackle sanitation, electricity or water issues in the areas where they are the most needed, that is to say in the north. As a result the master plan does not seem to provide solution to people's needs and problems. Only two villages are included in the master plan and they are among the richest of the area. Thus, the danger of building a two-speed city is real problem. Local stakeholders have clearly chosen a development approach to deal with Bamiyan's issues. Nevertheless, in the northern villages of Bamiyan, there is an urgent need for an emergency approach. Bamiyan is in a transitional phase, where both emergency and development approaches are required.

Yet, the idea of a master plan should not be given up. A general consensus on the necessity of an urban plan is still true for both villagers and the local authorities. This consensus is worth paying attention to. Indeed it seems that in everyone's mind the development of a modern city remains the objective and symbolises a successful development. This is especially true for the population of Bamiyan who has experienced war and exile abroad. In this sense, building a city is also a way for a population who has experienced significant discrimination in the past to demonstrate that Hazara people are capable of building their own and successful development projects. It is possible to identify here some kind of irrational desire for expansion which the area may not necessarily need or indeed may not be capable of becoming a city so fast. One has the feeling that for the people of Bamiyan the city symbolises the solution to all their problems. The myth of the modern city is very strong and is shared by all the population, especially those who have returned from abroad. Nevertheless where opinions begin to diverge is how to build this city and where the priorities lie. Bamiyan city has become a symbol for a country currently trying to catch up with modernity and development.

INTRODUCTION

The urban sector of the Linking Relief Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) programme is partly the continuation of two types of exercises that have been carried out by Groupe URD in Afghanistan. It is the continuation of 1) the Quality project and the EIMS focused on the urban projects and 2) the lesson sharing exercise done with the chapter "The case of Kabul" in *Cities at war, wars in cities*, Karthala, 2004.

Research carried out on the urban sector within the LRRD programme aims at understanding the way that the urban system is likely to progress into the phase between emergency and development. The objective of this component is to strengthen the capacity of Afghan institutions and international actors to plan their urban activities on the basis of an adequate knowledge base. To achieve these objectives, an applied research study is planned in Kabul, Bamiyan and Jalalabad.


This report is the result of the study carried out in Bamiyan between July and October 2005.

The global aim of this study was to obtain a picture of current development in Bamiyan with a specific focus on its potential urban development. The aim was not to conduct a quantitative survey but a qualitative one, in order to be able to grasp the true main tendencies of the current situation of Bamiyan.

This study is based on a two phases: surveys and field research. The first part of the survey was carried out between 25 July and 5 September 2005 and the second part over two weeks between 15-30 October.

One of the first difficulties encountered on conducting this study was identifying the limits of what is known as Bamiyan city. As a matter of fact, Bamiyan city does not officially exist there are no official boundaries. Nevertheless, the twelve closest villages to the bazaar area (less than 20 minutes by car) have been selected as part of Bamiyan city. Hence, in the following report, Bamiyan city will refer to the bazaar and its twelve closest villages (cf. Figure 1).

Figure 1: Layout of Bamiyan city



Source: Author based on 2004 UNESCO map


The first phase of the survey focused on field visits to the villages and interviews with both the chief of the village and a selection of the more vulnerable families among the villagers. Likewise interviews were conducted with local authorities (governor office, different ministries, mayor), UN organisations, and international and local NGOs working in Bamiyan.

The second phase of the study focused on interviews with a selection of rich families (twelve) in four villages already selected, and on the selection of another series of ten villages (cf. Figure 2) located in remote areas in relation to the bazaar. This phase carried out over two weeks in October 2005.

In total 77 families, 23 chiefs of village and thirteen shopkeepers were interviewed over the two phases.

This study seeks to address the relevance of designing a master plan for Bamiyan's future development. It highlights the difficulty of striking a balance between the need to cope with urgent livelihood issues and promote sustainable development. This area has reached a crucial phase in its development process. The situation in Bamiyan today illustrates all too well new linkages between rural and urban contexts. Evidently building a city conjures up a dream of modernity, a desire to reach higher degrees of development. Nevertheless the question remains as whether building a city is the most appropriate response to enhancing livelihoods in Bamiyan? Furthermore how can development plans both preserve historical and cultural areas whilst also allowing for much needed economic development?

Figure 2: Villages visited during the second phase of the field study



Source: Author based on 2004 UNESCO map

1 CONTEXT IN BAMMIYAN

1.1 GEOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT

Bamiyan province is located in the central highlands of Afghanistan (cf. Figure 3).


Figure 3: 32 provinces of Afghanistan



Source: Encyclopaedia Wikipedia modified by the author, 2006


Bamiyan is both the name of a province and of a district within this province. The province of Bamiyan is composed of five districts: Yakawlang, Panjab, Waras, Shibar and Bamiyan (cf. Figure 4).

Figure 4: Composition of the district of Bamiyan



Bamiyan district is composed of one main valley located at 2,500m altitude, 120km north-west of Kabul. Bamiyan valley is the focus point of three other smaller valleys: Foladi valley, Sokhdar valley and Gorwana valley (cf. Figure 5)

Figure 5: Main valleys of Bamiyan district



Source: Author based on 2004 UNESCO map

Bamiyan valley is the main focal point of the area. This valley measures 12km east-west and 4km north-south at its widest point¹⁰. To the south, the valley is surrounded by a large plateau where the “new city” is located with the airport. Bamiyan valley is sandwiched by two high mountain ranges: the Kuh-I-Sangichaspan to the North and the Kuh-I-Baba to the South. The Kuh-ibBaba peak stands at 5,143m, whereas the Sangichaspan stands at 4,400m. The majority of the headwaters of the rivers and streams in the Bamiyan region originate in the Kuh-I-Baba¹¹.

The climate of the Bamiyan region is dry and continental. Winters are extremely cold and very long. The coldest month is January with the average temperature of -5/-6°C and in summer day time temperatures may exceed 30°C¹².

1.2 POLITICAL CONTEXT

Compared with other provinces, the political context in Bamiyan area is very stable. Indeed Bamiyan area is a peaceful and quiet area and there are rarely security incidents. Similarly the growing of poppy does not constitute an object of concern. Compared with some other regions, there are no local commanders who continue to influence or exert their power on the population.

¹⁰ UNESO, 2004

¹¹ idem

¹² ibid

The state is really present, especially in Bamiyan centre. Bamiyan city is the capital of the province so all the offices of the different ministries and the governor's office are based here. That is also why many NGOs have chosen to set up their regional offices in Bamiyan, even if their activities extend over a much wider area.

This secure political context may also be one of the reasons why Bamiyan is not a high priority in terms of investment from central government and international donors in comparison with other provinces (especially provinces in the south and the east).

A new governor has been appointed recently (March 2005) by President Karzai: Ms Sarobi. She is the first women governor in Afghan history.

2 STAKEHOLDERS IN BAMMIYAN

Since the end of the war, an increasing number of official stakeholders have been established in Bamiyan. Indeed after 25 years of war, the state is now truly present and is well represented in this area. Nevertheless, local government continues to be weak and fairly powerless.

2.1 NEW LOCAL AUTHORITIES

2.1.1 The new governor: representing the new national government

Ms Sarobi is the first and only women governor in Afghanistan. She was appointed by President Karzai in March 2005 and prior to this, she was the Minister of Women's Affairs. She is in charge of the coordination of all central government staff working in Bamiyan provinces. As the first representative of central government, she is the direct mediator between local stakeholders, the population and central government. The governor is the local decision authority for all the stakeholders in the province.

All stakeholders agree that she has brought major changes in Bamiyan government. She has introduced new methods and improved transparency and legality. Her predecessor was renowned for various embezzlements, especially misappropriation of funds with the collusion of the mayor (from the selling of government lands).

2.1.2 Provincial ministries: present but powerless

More and more national ministries are represented in Bamiyan, recently the Ministry of Urban Development and Housing opened an office, headed by one engineer coming from Kabul. The ministries are all located and gathered on the plateau, around the governor office (cf. Figure 1). These ministries are effectively powerless since they have no budget and lack staff. For instance the Minister of urban development and housing is working alone and with no equipment. He has just a house and a desk. According to the governor, Bamiyan province does not get an appropriate share of the national development budget. As a matter of fact, it is right now impossible to know whether or not the province has received funds from central government. There are no official figures. It turns out that Bamiyan local government has no money to implement projects. In this regard, the governor is totally dependant on funding from UN organisations and international NGOs for projects in the area.

2.1.3 The mayor: symbol of the “former” unofficial network of power

Before 2001, there was no mayor in Bamiyan. The mayor, M. Nasir Ahmad, was appointed by the former governor and remains one of the last vestiges of Afghanistan's old political scene. Unfortunately his role and responsibilities have not been clearly defined. The municipality seems to constitute a separate department over which the governor does not have much power. In this regard the municipality has no budget; it is self sufficient and functions with taxes collected from shopkeepers. Indeed, the mayor himself is unable to clarify exactly what he is in charge of. Clearly he collects taxes from shopkeepers in the bazaar. Nevertheless some shopkeepers claim that they pay two taxes: one to the mayor and one to the Ministry of Economy, whereas they should officially only pay one to the Ministry of Economy. For several years, the Ministry of economy had no office or representatives in Bamiyan. As a result the mayor took advantage of the situation to collect the taxes himself. Today, the situation is problematic as no shopkeepers really understand to whom they should pay their taxes. Moreover, whereas the rate of taxes collected by the

Ministry of economy is fixed and official, the tax collected by the mayor is variable according to the relationship between the shopkeeper and the mayor.

Officially the taxes collected by the mayor should be used for the maintenance and the cleaning of the bazaar, especially the main road in the bazaar which is significantly damaged. Nevertheless, many shopkeepers complain about the lack of cleaning and poor maintenance, saying that the mayor is not using the money collected for this work. Officially there are twelve people working for the municipality of Bamiyan but the nature of their work is not known.

Another issue linked to the constitution of Bamiyan municipality is the municipality boundaries. At present, they are not clearly defined. Indeed, the municipality does not work in the villages but only in the bazaar area. Another problem related to the mayor's functions is the selling off of land illegally. The village of Zargaran was created by the mayor: he sold plots of land belonging to the villages of Saudi and Jugra Khil in order to create this new village on the mountainside. He sold land to vulnerable households, to newcomers and landless returnees. For a plot of land of 400m², he asks between 2,000-4,000 afghanis (US\$40-80). However the distribution of land is being carried out without the prior agreement of the governor, which makes it illegal.

2.2 INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: LACK OF COORDINATION

2.2.1 International organisations

2.2.1.1 United Nations organisations

Since 2001, the United Nations have set up offices for its different agencies in Bamiyan city.

- ***UNAMA (United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan)***

This office is in charge of assisting local government, especially the governor. A strong cooperation between the governor and UNAMA has been established and the governor works very closely with UNAMA. Its main task is capacity building and civil service training. Moreover they coordinate activities carried out by UN agencies, other organisations and NGOs working in Bamiyan. They are also in charge, in cooperation with the PRT, of ensuring security in the area. For example, UNAMA has implemented a disarmament programme for the war lords in the area.

- ***UNOPS (United Nations Office for Project Services)***

This agency is in charge of building different infrastructure within the district of Bamiyan: roads, bridges, etc. Until 2004, they were also in charge of clearing snow on the road to Kabul. They were also in charge of the organisation and control of the last legislative elections. This office is the technical branch for all UN activities in Bamiyan.

- ***UN HABITAT***

Since 2003, UN HABITAT has been in charge of implementing the National Solidarity Program (NSP) in Bamiyan centre, which was designed at a national level for all Afghanistan provinces and financed by the World Bank. In Bamiyan, UN-HABITAT is the contracting partner of the WB for the NSP, but in other regions of Afghanistan, NGOs such as Solidarités

or AKDN are in charge of implementing the NSP programme¹³. Before this programme, UN-HABITAT implemented a programme focused on rehabilitating the bazaar. They built taps for drinking water along the road of the bazaar available for everyone and they also set up rubbish removal system in the bazaar but the bins are no longer emptied.

- ***UNHCR (United Nations office of the High Commissioner for Refugees)***

Only one expatriate is based in this office. He is in charge of assisting the numerous refugees and IDPs who have returned to Bamiyan since 2001. In this regard, UNHCR staff deal with:

- Reintegration of returnees: shelter is provided for the more vulnerable returnees who no longer have houses
- Land disputes: Legal assistance is provided to people who have had their land stolen in partnership with NRC.
- Maintenance of “peace community”: Programmes with an ethnic focus are implemented to help smooth relations in villages where Hazara and Tajik people live together. They help them to implement community projects together, such the building of a school.
- Distribution of cash to vulnerable households
- WATSAN programme: Areas where returnees have resettled that have no access to water are targeted.
- Capacity building for staff from the Ministry of refugees. Support and monitoring is provided for all activities carried out by this office.

- UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund)

This branch has no longer expatriate staff based in Bamiyan city, only four local people are working in this office. Only two programmes will continue to be run in 2006. One focuses on health, with the running of a polio vaccination programme three times a year throughout the whole province. The other one is focused on school material distributions for both teachers and children. Until 2005, they also had a WATSAN programme. They build 20 wells and seven latrines in different schools of the province.

- ***UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation)***

UNESCO does not a permanent office in Bamiyan but a number of field missions are carried out in the area. UNESCO representatives working in Bamiyan come from two branches. The first branch focuses on archaeological and cultural issues, especially the rehabilitation of the Buddha holes to prevent their collapse. They also conduct archaeological research (mainly the collection of fragments of mural paintings). This branch of UNESCO is based in the office of the Ministry of Cultural Affairs. The other branch deals with the design of a management plan of conservation of historical and natural zones of Bamiyan. In December 2005, the working group composed of four experts published a list of recommendations for the local authorities for the conservation of the Bamiyan site. In addition to this, UNESCO worked in partnership with the local authorities for the opening of the new Bamiyan Training Centre for Cultural Heritage Conservation that has been recently inaugurated.

- ***WFP (World Food Program)***

¹³ More information on the NSP programme in Bamiyan is available in the section 2.4: *Shuras* and the NSP programme.

This office is headed by two expatriates and employs around 25 local employees. Nevertheless this office is winding down its activities since Bamiyan no longer has such an urgent need for emergency relief whereas WFP focused on this type of response through the distribution of food and wheat. In this regard, they have implemented food for work programme during 2002-2004 especially with the French NGO Solidarités but these programmes have now terminated. The WFP continues to support various remote areas and schools throughout the province.

2.2.1.2 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

There are no expatriate people in this office since this organisation has a local branch in Bamiyan: the Afghan Red Cross. The role of this ICRC office is to support the Afghan Red Cross society (ARC) with a solid partnership. Their activities focused on providing support to displaced people and managing the central hospital of Bamiyan city until November 2003. Indeed since 2003, hospital management has been headed by a local NGO, AKHS, but ICRC continues to fund a full surgical team, provide electricity and water system and pay the salaries of twenty local employees. In 2003 they also provide ARC with a six-month medical package. In 2002 they provided 900 families in Bamiyan district with food, food materials and agricultural materials. In 2004, they implemented a veterinary programme in Bamiyan and Yakawlang and they also implemented a women's training service programme which focused on teaching women how to grow and use vegetables. They also supplied education promotion for women (how to take care of children, how to clean the house, etc.). For 2005-2006, two programmes are being implemented. One programme focuses on Water and Habitat activities through the construction of irrigation canals, pipe networks and a reservoir of drinking water for all provinces in Bamiyan. The other programme focuses on disabled people: providing artificial legs/arms and assistance for people requiring treatment in Kabul. Until 2003, they implemented emergency programme but since these programmes have evolved and now focused on a development approach.

2.2.1.3 International cooperation

Only two countries have set up offices for their overseas aid agencies in Bamiyan city. These two countries, Japan and USA, are also the two main funding bodies for development in Bamiyan and work closely with the governor.

- ***JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency)***

This government body is currently working in Bamiyan on the request of the Afghan Ministry of Women. Today they only have at their disposal an office inside the building of the Bamiyan representation of the Ministry of women. Only one expatriate and three local people are working in Bamiyan city. JICA's activities are focused on gender issues with a US\$300,000 annual budget. Their main mission is capacity building among the Ministries. They are trying to set up a day care centre for women and children. They also have two other projects underway for next year focused on women's health. JICA is also working with the governor on the master plan of Bamiyan and on the rehabilitation of the Buddhas. They will probably be one of the main funding bodies for the future development of Bamiyan since they seem to be ready to invest in Bamiyan, especially in the tourist area.

- ***USAID (United States Agency for International Development)***

Along with the PRT office, USAID office is based inside the military base. USAID's 2005 budget is US\$20 million. Theoretically, they work on improving democracy and governance through capacity building among the local authorities, especially the governor. They try to

provide support for economic development in Bamiyan through the Ministry of Economy's local office. Their last point of focus is the social sector. They do not implement programmes directly but act as a donor since they fund various local NGOs and international NGOs. In this regard they play an important role in the economic development of Bamiyan. They also have a strong political influence on the local authorities. They participate in a variety of meetings with the governor, especially with regard to the design of the master plan. Only one expatriate woman is in charge of coordinating USAID's activities in Bamiyan and she is also in charge of managing and coordinating PRT activities in partnership with military staff. The PRT and USAID are strongly linked.

2.2.1.4 Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)

Around 200 soldiers of New Zealand origin are based in Bamiyan. The PRT funded a number of local construction companies and NGOs to carry out building projects in the Bamiyan area. For example, they financed the construction of the new University last year. They also participated with UNOPS in snow clearing operations, especially on the road to Kabul. This year PRT will probably repeat these efforts, especially since UNOPS has made it clear that they will no longer carry out this activity. As from today, snow clearance should be a government activity financed by a UN organisation but the government does not yet appear to be ready to take responsibility for this activity. This is why at winter time, when the road is blocked by snow, the PRT will have no choice but to clear the snow.

2.2.2 International NGOs

Five international NGOs have set up permanent offices in Bamiyan city: Solidarités, AKDN (Aga Khan Development Network), Save the Children, NRC (Norwegian Refugee Council) and CHF (Community Habitat Finance).

In terms of the local economy, today NGOs play the role of the private sector: they implement projects, they employ people and they contract local companies. They are at the core of the local economy. Indeed the private sector is very weak in the area. The construction sector alone has a few local businesses that succeed in generating a reasonable turnover.

The NGO with the most activities in the area is AKDN. This organisation is probably the one that employs the largest number of people with over 400 Afghan staff working in the whole province. AKDN invests massively in Bamiyan and seems willing to become a permanent actor in this area. They have built big buildings for their offices and are increasingly present and powerful. Indeed, it is the only NGO and international organisation to have increased the number of expatriate staff working permanently in Bamiyan city (from two to eight since 2002). They work in a variety of sectors: education, health, micro-credit, agriculture. Their budget has doubled in the last year.

Another NGO that is well integrated in Bamiyan city is the French NGO, Solidarités. However, Solidarités is winding down its activities in the area. Solidarités is experiencing the opposite evolution of AKDN since they hit their peak in 2002-2004 with nine expatriate staff whereas today there is only one expatriate left working on one agricultural programme, employing around twenty local employees.

All the NGOs agree on the fact they no longer carry out emergency programmes but development programmes. The majority of international actors that are present today were more active during the emergency phase (2001-2004) but are now leaving the area or at least winding down their activities. This transition between emergency and development is

not always easy to handle. AKDN for example reported having difficulties in encouraging people to participate in its development programme. Indeed for almost twenty years Afghan people became used to receiving emergency aid with little local participation, and they do not always understand or accept why today they need to be involved and why they cannot just continue to receive.

Recently NGOs have been asked by the governor and the ministries to provide reports and feedback on their activities. Currently central government has requested that each ministry with offices in Bamiyan produce a master plan for their sector. In this regard, NGOs have been asked to participate in establishing a master plan for each sector of intervention. The aim of these master plans is to underline the needs of the province and to draw central government's attention to these issues. They will also form the basis for the planning of the budget transfer from central government. As a result different NGOs in each sector have been invited to meet and to coordinate their activities in order to build a global assessment of the needs of Bamiyan province. However in order to establish good coordination between the different stakeholders in each sector, there needs to be civil servants in charge of this work. Today, the human resources factor is severely lacking.

2.3 GREAT VARIETY OF LOCAL NGOS

There are 86 local NGOs that are officially registered in Bamiyan district. They work on a variety of different subjects. Certain activities are more focused than others, such as the gender issue, micro-credit, democracy promotion and agricultural issues. All these local NGOs are funded by international donors, mainly USAID and the World Bank. Some work autonomously but the majority work in partnership with international organisations such as Solidarités, AKDN and WFP. Of the 86 registered NGOs, we can assume that only 10% of these NGOs are effectively operational. Many exist on paper alone but have no real activities since they lack funding. Indeed in the field, very few are really capable of implementing a project. The main problem is the lack of skilled people. Others claim that they are NGOs whereas in reality they are private companies. This is the case for companies that are contracted work by international stakeholders. Often international stakeholders sub-contract work out to local companies. For instance, HCC who is currently in charge of building the new training centre in Bamiyan bazaar has been contracted by JICA. This company employs 45 Afghan workers and has a US\$300,000 budget for Bamiyan.

One example of a local NGO that works autonomously but with international funds is CHF (Community Habitat Finance). This NGO is specialised in the provision of loans and micro-credit, and they also have a construction branch (schools, clinics throughout the province). Last year they provided loans (up to US\$500) to 700 groups of people, both men and women. They are financed by the World Bank for the micro-credit section and by USAID for the construction branch. Another interesting example is the CCA (Central Cooperation for Afghanistan). This NGO has been working in Bamiyan for 25 years and as a result they have a very thorough knowledge of the needs of the Bamiyan population. They are funded by the WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF and the Norwegian cooperation. This NGO employs 120 Afghan people. They implement different kind of programmes, including emergency programmes through food and clothes distribution, but also training programmes. They have built one vocational centre and employ teachers who work directly in the more remote villages.

As a result of the increasing number of local NGOs in Bamiyan, a new stakeholder has recently emerged: the NNC (National NGOs Coordination). This NGO tries to act as an umbrella organisation for all local NGOs. Their members want to establish better links between international donors and local NGOs. Until now, NNC has had a limited influence and their role remains uncertain but they are also very new on the scene. They ask every local NGO to join their group and to pay a fee to be part of NNC. Then the NNC offers a

guarantee of quality work and reliability to the international NGOs who are looking to work with local NGOs. To sum up, NNC offers a label of quality. International stakeholders seem to be quite interested by their role but establishing a coordination network with local NGOs is a complicated task. There are many local NGOs which means that they are often in competition with each other.

2.4 SHURAS AND THE INFLUENCE OF THE NSP PROGRAMME

2.4.1 What is a *shura*?

Every village in Afghanistan is organised around a community organisation, known as the *shura*. Traditionally the *shura* is headed by the elders of the community. The *shura* plays a key role as its members take all the decisions concerning the village's rules and organisation. In this model of *shura*, women and young people are for main part excluded.

2.4.2 The new *shuras* and the NSP Programme

A new model of *shura* is today being promoted through the NSP programme. The National Solidarity Programme (NSP) was defined in the National Development Framework (NDF)¹⁴ and remains one of the government's National Priority Programmes (NPPs). The objective of the NSP is to empower communities to plan, manage, finance and monitor their own development programmes. Managed by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), the NSP aims to lay "the foundations of community level good governance" and "support community-managed sub-projects for reconstruction and development to improve the access of rural communities to social and productive infrastructure and services". The goal is to reach every village in the country – approximately 20,000 – over the next three or four years. Funding for the NSP is mainly provided by the World Bank's International Development Association (IDA).

The aim of this programme is to develop capacity building among the population. In every village, a Community Development Council (CDC) is set up by means of democratic election, whose task will be to decide which projects are most urgently required in the village. To implement these projects in every village, the World Bank gives US\$200 per family. The most common projects selected by the CDC are the construction of wells, bridges, schools, the purchase of a generator, reservoir tanks, etc. The CDC is in charge of the implementation of the project selected, through the hiring of a local construction company. The organisation in charge of the implementation of the NSP is simply responsible for monitoring the different phases of the programme.

The NSP has been criticised for its artificial way of organising people. Indeed the NSP imposes that in every village all the individuals, women, men, elders, disabled people, are equal yet this transition is by no means straightforward in Afghan culture. Often one *shura* for men and one for women are set up. Even if in theory, this all seems ideal, in practice it is a little more complicated. A huge change in people's mentalities and cultural habits is required if 'democracy' is really to be established and above all function. Furthermore in some villages traditional *shuras* and new *shuras* are required to work together or alongside each other at least. This is sometimes the source of problems, even disputes within the village.

¹⁴ elaborated during the Bonn Conference of 2002

2.5 CONCLUSION: WHICH NETWORK OF POWER IN BAMIYAN CITY?

Evidently international aid is on the wane today in Bamiyan. Many UN agencies and international organisations have fewer expatriate staff working permanently in Bamiyan city, but they use their offices as a base for regular missions to the provinces. It remains unsure whether international NGOs will stay in Bamiyan. They arrived in 2001 when it was one of the more secure areas in Afghanistan and it was easy to work. But today, fewer emergency programmes are required in Bamiyan and the NGOs, who are unable or do not necessarily want to evolve towards development programme, are leaving the area. Half of the UN agencies have no more expatriate staff and carry out only a few activities.

Bamiyan city has a series of multiple and contradictory power infrastructure. On the one hand, there is the classic international presence that strongly supports and influences through capacity building the new official power represented by the governor and local ministries. On the other hand, there is the mayor who represents a more informal power resulting from the many years of war. In addition to this, international NGOs experience difficulties in establishing a balance in their relationship with the new official power. Indeed central government through the governor and its ministries is asking for a stronger partnership with NGOs including a tighter control of their activities. International NGOs are unsure how to react and what strategy to implement. They are not used to dealing with this increasingly powerful state who is today trying to impose its authority throughout the country. It will be interesting to see whether NGOs will succeed in preserving their independence whilst also coordinating their activities with the government. In the health sector at the national level, the Afghan ministry is currently trying to engage NGOs as sub-contractors of its health policy. Does this change represent a new type of partnership between NGOs and the Afghan government? And what about NGOs who refuse to enter into this type of partnership? It is easy to understand why some NGOs fear that they will become mere operators for the Afghan government and will lose their non-governmental aspect. On the other hand, it should also be pointed out that some NGOs have refused to account for their activities to the local authorities and in this way, are failing to take into account that Afghanistan is no longer a stateless country but one with a new national government in the making. Once again, the main issue at stake is identifying a satisfactory balance between these two approaches. The new law that was passed in 2005 regulating the activities of NGOs is a significant example of the government's desire to have more control over NGOs present in the country.

More than controls, it is coordination between NGOs themselves that seems to be urgently required but they are reluctant to share information and to build partnerships. They prefer to conduct different programmes in a same area rather than working together to implement a bigger and better project. Indeed one of the striking aspects of international activities in Bamiyan is the lack of coordination between the different stakeholders.

3 HISTORY OF BAMIIAN'S SLOW DEVELOPMENT

3.1 FROM DISCOVERY TO TOURISM

To get data and information on the physical reality and organisation of Bamiyan before the 1960s is not easy. Before this time, only a few explorers had visited this area attracted by the two giant Buddhas. William Moorcroft arrived in Bamiyan in 1824 and described the area as a very quiet rural area organised around a small market. He noticed the presence of people living in many caves around the Buddhas. Sikandar Burnes and Charles Masson also came to Bamiyan during the second half of the 19th century but they did not give a precise description of Bamiyan city, preferring to focus their description on the Buddhas. During the 20th century, many European visitors came to Bamiyan as tourists, including Ella Maillart. They came to see the work carried out by the French team of archaeologists (DAFA) in charge of the discovery and analysis of the amazing cultural heritage of Bamiyan. In 1924 Andre and Yeda Godard noticed the presence of 200 families living in caves around the Buddhas. Their cattle and crops occupied the caves located in the upper floor¹⁵. The archaeologist also discovered other historical sites in different areas around Bamiyan, especially in Folady and Dukoney valley. In the 1950s, N.I. Vavilov published a book on agriculture in Afghanistan. He described Bamiyan as an authentic agricultural area with the cultivation of many crops and a population living both in caves and houses gathered in small villages¹⁶. In comparison with other provinces in Afghanistan, especially Kabul, which had achieved a fairly advanced level of development thanks to international investment, the province of Bamiyan had benefited from none of these advantages. Indeed the Hazara people suffered from ethnic discrimination from the central power. As a result Bamiyan at that time had no school and no hospital. The Hazara people did not have the right to finish high school nor to go to university. Furthermore, people had to cope with regular incursions of nomadic people who destroyed or stole their crops at summer time.

From the 1950s onwards, Bamiyan attracted an increasing number of visitors. Indeed, Bamiyan became one of the sites to visit in Afghanistan. In 1969, more than 60,000 people came to Afghanistan¹⁷. In 1974 the "Guides bleus" described Bamiyan as a city of 10,000 inhabitants¹⁸. However, the soviet invasion brutally stopped all tourism and archaeological research.

3.2 DURING THE SOVIETIC ATTACK

In 1979, there was considerable fighting between the government and Mujahideen in Bamiyan centre. The road between Shibard district and Bamiyan centre was closed. The government succeeded in maintaining control of an area of 5km around the bazaar. The Mujahideen attacked Bamiyan centre but they were unable to take control of the whole area. The main Kabul-Bamiyan axis (to the south) was under the control of the Mujahideen and a lot of fighting occurred in this area¹⁹. Nevertheless in 1981 the Russians stopped all their operations in Hazarajat. As a result, Bamiyan became an autonomous region in relation to central power, with an artificial office set up in Bamiyan city until the fall of the Soviet regime. The discrimination of the Hazara people ceased thanks to the presence of the Russians.

¹⁵ Centlivres, 2001

¹⁶ Centlivres, 2001

¹⁷ Dorronsoro, 2000

¹⁸ Centlivres, 2001

¹⁹ WFP, 2003

Under the Soviet occupation, the Hazara people had the same rights as other ethnic groups. During the Russian presence in Afghanistan there was much internal fighting in Hazarajat between different political parties. But when the civil war began in 1992, Bamiyan almost became independent headed by one political party²⁰. Despite the fact that Bamiyan was spared in relative terms under the soviet occupation, many inhabitants chose to go abroad during this period. Although there are no exact figures available, it should be pointed out that 25% of the Afghan population (i.e. three million people) went into exile in Pakistan and two million people fled to Iran at the end of the 1970s. As a result, the Afghan population constituted the biggest refugee population in the world²¹.

3.3 DURING THE CIVIL WAR

Most of the destruction that occurred in Bamiyan took place not during the soviet occupation but during the civil war. There was a great deal of fighting between the Mujahideen and various other groups (Wahdat, Hezbe islame, *Shurae nezar*). During the period of 1992 to 1996, many people especially those who had links with the communist regime fled to Iran and Pakistan out of fear of reprisals. The Hazara party of Wahdat and the Tajik forces of Massoud fought for control of Bamiyan in 1995 for six months. The Tajik commander was defeated in Kahmard. As they retreat, they destroyed most of the Hazara villages in Bamiyan district, especially Bamiyan centre²².

3.4 DURING THE TALIBAN REGIME (1996-2001)

After the fall of Kabul in September 1996, the Taliban attacked on several different fronts along the borders of Hazarajat. Nevertheless the Taliban encountered significant resistance as the Hezb-I-Wahdat party defended its base. Finally after the capture of Mazar-I-sharif in August 1998, the Taliban army entered Saighan district in September 1998 and then entered Bamiyan when the Hazaras and Tajiks surrendered. Consequently on 12 September 1998, after a year of economic blockade imposed by the Taliban on the Bamiyan province, the Wahdat party lost Bamiyan, that is to say its base and capital²³.

The Wahdat party never totally surrendered arms and sporadic fighting continued. Indeed in January 1999 the Wahdat party took back Yakawlang district and in March entered Bamiyan for a few hours but were thrown out by a counter offensive. The frontline was stabilised a few kilometres out of Bamiyan towards Shaidan.

On March 1999, almost all the population of Bamiyan centre and surrounding villages were forced out of the area. From 8 May 1999, Bamiyan was under the control of the Taliban. Most of the Hazara people moved to the south side of Bamiyan centre and some moved to Behzud District of the Wardak Province. Many children and elderly people died of cold and hunger on Baba Mountain²⁴.

The Taliban killed more than 500 people in the centre of Bamiyan and more than 100 people from Sarasyab village. The fighting then ceased for over eighteen months. Nevertheless at the end of 2000, Northern Alliance forces tried to capture Bamiyan one more time from Yakawlang district. They broke through the frontlines on several occasions during 2001

²⁰ Centlivres, 2001

²¹ Dorronsoro, 2000

²² WFP, 2003

²³ Solidarités, 2003

²⁴ WFP, 2003

between Yakawland and Bamiyan district. As a result, many of the houses in this area were burned to the ground and the population forced to flee once again²⁵.

Following 11 September 2001, the fighting was reignited along the frontlines. With the help of US interventions, the Wahdat party intensified its fighting and finally forced the Taliban to withdraw at the beginning of November 2001.

One of the major consequences of the capture of Bamiyan by the Taliban was the destruction of the two giants Buddhas sculpted in the mountainside 1600 years ago. In addition to this, many Buddhist caves and sculptures were also destroyed. Similarly, the museum of Bamiyan was also raised to the ground by the Taliban. This widespread damage was perceived by the Hazara people as yet another discrimination against their culture.

During 25 years of war, most of the houses have suffered repeated damage at least three times and all the villagers have fled at least once. As a result all the population of Bamiyan can be considered either as returnees or IDPs.

3.5 SINCE 2001

After the events of 11 September, fear of American bombardments resulted in an influx of IDPs into Bamiyan centre which was seen as being a safe place. Subsequently, the change in government combined with pressure from Pakistan and Iran has resulted in the return of large numbers of refugees to Bamiyan centre, especially in the area close to the bazaar. Indeed Bamiyan bazaar was seen as having good job opportunities. Moreover, rumours that land was being distributed in the area had spread.

3.6 ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE HAZARA PEOPLE

Hazarajat is regarded as one of the most mono-ethnic regions in Afghanistan. There are three main ethnic groups in Bamiyan province: the Hazaras (60%), the Tajiks (35%) and the Pashtuns (5%)²⁶. Bamiyan province is often considered as the Hazara province. As the third most important ethnic group in Afghanistan, the Hazara people, unlike the rest of the Afghan population, are Shiite, a fact which has deepened their political and socio-economic marginalisation. The Hazaras have always suffered from discrimination. In the 1960s, Bamiyan was still lagging way behind other provinces in terms of development and still today the Hazara people are still struggling to achieve equal opportunities. They were the target of major attacks during the Taliban regime and all the villages in Hazarajat have been severely burned. According to many Hazara people, ethnic discrimination lies at the heart of slow development in the province.

²⁵ WFP, 2003

²⁶ WFP, 2003

4 WHAT IS AT STAKE TODAY IN BAMSIYAN

4.1 BAMSIYAN AS A POLE OF ATTRACTION

4.1.1 Population growth

Both the secure situation of Bamiyan and the large international presence have attracted many people since the end of the war. Moreover IDPs who fled to other provinces and refugees from Pakistan and Iran have now returned, sometimes after having spent twenty years abroad. According to the Ministry of Refugees of the province of Bamiyan, 14,293 refugees have now returned to the province since 2002 (15-20% remain in Iran and Pakistan). Another 5,161 have returned to the district of Bamiyan and 4,248 to Yakawlang. These two districts attract the majority of the refugees. The peak of returnees was reached in 2004 and remained high in 2005, whereas it was quite low in 2002-2003.

In terms of IDPs, 47,757 people have returned to the province of Bamiyan, of which a total of 31,000 people alone for the district of Bamiyan. As a result, it is obvious that Bamiyan centre attracts the greatest number of people. It is also important to point out that 30,040 IDPs have returned to their homeland during 2002 and 2003²⁷.

IDPs tend to move back faster than refugees but the Ministry of Refugees still expects to have to accommodate large numbers of refugees in the coming years.

In addition, IDPs from other provinces chose today to live in Bamiyan. They are attracted by the good security conditions in Bamiyan, the official intention of the local authorities to develop a "city", the presence of NGOs and the expansion of the bazaar. Nevertheless, people today are disappointed by what they experience in Bamiyan when the rumours of free land turn out to be unfounded. Indeed, there is not enough land for agricultural activities and there are no more job opportunities in the bazaar.

From the field visits that were carried out for this research project, it is possible to estimate that the overall population of the twelve villages identified as being part of Bamiyan city as being to 3,415 families, i.e. 20,490 people if one considers there are, on average, six members in each family²⁸. This means that the population has doubled since 1974.

4.1.2 The bazaar: the economic hub of Bamiyan district

Bamiyan has one focal point: a bazaar comprising approximately 1,000 small shops. This bazaar is located in the valley and forms a street parallel to the holes left by the Buddhas in the mountains. The current bazaar, called "the new bazaar", was established in this area by the Hazara political party in 1995. Before this, it was located on the west side, next to the Buddhas. However this "old bazaar" became too small and was eventually replaced by the new one situated in a more central place. The new bazaar was built on land that belonged to the Ministry of Agriculture. There are no houses around the present bazaar, as people are living in different villages around the bazaar. The bazaar of Bamiyan has undergone huge

²⁷ These figures were provided by the Ministry of Refugees of Bamiyan in August 2005. It is important to bear in mind that these figures are not precise given that not everyone who arrives in Bamiyan goes to the Ministry to be registered.


²⁸ Cf. Annexe 2

development since 2002 when there were only around 50 shops. Every day it attracts more daily workers, especially newcomers without land and as a result, it expands.

Most of the goods sold in the bazaar are supplied from Kabul or imported directly from Ghazni, and to a lesser extent from Mazar-I-Charif. Locally produced food such as wheat, potatoes and some seasonal vegetables and fruit can only be found in the bazaar for a two-month period after the harvest. Market activities increase from April to December but drop from January to March²⁹.

Bamiyan “city” is defined by all the inhabitants and local authorities as a rural area, or at least as a mix of urban and rural area. The concept of city has no clear signification for the population or the inhabitants reduce it to the bazaar. Yet, what is clear is that for the ten other villages (cf. Figure 2) visited (within 1.5 hours of the bazaar), Bamiyan bazaar also represents an important economic hub (Figure 6) but their remote location and their very lack of infrastructure prevents us from considering them as part of Bamiyan “city”.

Figure 6: Bamiyan bazaar is the focal point for the district



Source: Author, 2006

4.1.3 Creation of new villages

One logical impact of population growth is the creation of three new villages in Bamiyan city since 2002: Zargaran, Sang Chespan and Mollah Gholum (cf. Figure 7).

The first village, Zargaran is totally illegal. It is situated on the mountainside between Daudi and Jugra Khil and it owes its existence to the illegal selling off of land by the mayor. Indeed the mayor regularly sells land belonging to the Daudi and Jugra Khil people. This new village has undergone the most rapid growth since the majority of newcomers settle here. The creation of this village has resulted in major land disputes. Indeed the land that is now occupied by the newcomers is where people from Daudi and Jugra Khil used to access the

²⁹ WFP, 2003

ailocks with their livestock. A plot of land of 300m² is sold for 4,100 afghanis (€75)³⁰. There is no infrastructure in this village and it is probably occupied by the poorest inhabitants of the valley. Many families are landless, they work as daily workers in the bazaar, but as the labour market in the bazaar is increasingly saturated, the majority are jobless.

Two other villages, Mollah Ghollum and Shang Chespan (cf. Figure 7) have been officially created by the former governor and their development is supported by local NGOs (CAWC and Shuada). At first, the purpose of these villages was to provide accommodation for people living in the caves around the giant Buddhas. In Mollah Ghollum, located few kilometres away from the Buddhas on the road to Yakawland, half of the 80 houses were built by NGOs and have been given to people working for the government and to 'friends' of the former governor. In Chang Shespan the distribution of the 100 houses was a little more official and it appears that cave dwellers were indeed among the beneficiaries. The problem is that this village was built on a small plateau and no water network was planned. Indeed, there is no water at all in this area. As a result, some of the beneficiaries preferred to sell their houses and return to the caves they occupied before, where they had easier access to water. Local authorities were completely responsible for building these two villages: all the houses look alike and have been given to families for free.

In these three new villages, most people are landless and have no livestock. They have very few links with rural activities. Apart from Mollah Ghollum, where a large proportion of people working for the government or teachers live, these villages are almost totally linked to the economy of the bazaar.

4.2 ISSUES AT STAKE

4.2.1 Shortage of land

The shortage of land highlights the problem of catering for newcomers who have to deal with the unofficial land distribution policy or simply the lack of land policy. Political tensions between the governor and the mayor are also part of the problem. The mayor continues to sell land located in the mountainside areas whereas it is forbidden and no infrastructure is planned. Moreover there is no more available land throughout the valley. Currently the governor is seeking new available land in Yakawlang to accommodate newcomers who have no choice but to live in caves. Likewise a new village on the east side (45 minutes away from the bazaar by car) has been informally created by refugees without assistance from any organisation or from the local authorities. According to the inhabitants of this new village, the local authorities are aware of their presence but have not intervened at present. They are letting them build their houses. Today, 130 families are gathered in this area but this village is not organised and there is no leader. The inhabitants say they had no choice but to settle here since there was no other free land in the area.

4.2.2 Difficult access to water

In every village visited people highlighted the fact that access to water is the top priority. Rural villages are experiencing difficulties in irrigating their land. Poor villages located in the northern part of the mountainside do not have access to drinking water. Originally, some of these people were living in the caves, some are still living in this type of accommodation, but many one-room mud houses have been built over the last few years.

³⁰ This is not an official price since the mayor does not acknowledge that this land is being sold. Inhabitants of Zargaran informed us of this price.

Several wells have been built by the NGO Solidarités, but many of them no longer function. “In the Bamiyan district, every village has five wells and five springs on average which can be reached in 20 minutes walking time (sometimes up to one hour). Roughly one third of these wells are private wells and two third are drilled by different organisations for public use. Many of these existing wells dried out due to the drought of the last years or are out of order because of missing or stolen hand pumps. The French NGO Solidarities examined eleven representative wells in the Bamiyan district of which 18% were out of order.”³¹ During spring and summer, people take water from rivers and streams but they are heavily polluted. Indeed among the 66 vulnerable families interviewed only 19 families have direct access to a well³². In winter time, access to water is even more difficult since streams are dry. People have to go further to get water, sometimes more than two hours walk. Not every family has a donkey. Indeed among the 66 vulnerable families interviewed, only 23 families have a donkey. Among the villages that lack access to drinking water, Shang Chespan is the one that experiences the most difficulties. This village was built in a very dry area and no water system was planned. As a result, some families would rather give up the house they received than stay in a totally dry area where access to water is very difficult. In the bazaar, villagers have access to drinking water thank to the water reservoir: the water supply system was built by UN-HABITAT. Villages located very close to the bazaar, such as Zargaran or Daudi, have little choice but to collect their drinking water from the bazaar.

4.2.3 Lack of infrastructure

In terms of the quality of the infrastructure network, Bamiyan still has a long way to go before it can be classified as a city, if one considers that a city can be defined by its capacity to offer a services network to its inhabitants. Bamiyan area is a very remote area. The road between Bamiyan and Kabul is really bad: it takes at almost eight hours to reach Kabul and for the trucks, the journey is even longer and more dangerous. During winter, most of the roads are closed. Likewise no electricity network has been built. Only the richest villages have been able to buy a generator. Among the 77 families interviewed only 25 (included the eleven rich families) had access to electricity through a generator. In addition, there is no sanitation system. Access to improved latrines and adequate sanitation in Bamiyan is very low. Of the 77 families interviewed, 52 (included the 11 rich families) have traditional latrines which are usually unsanitary single vault latrines built above ground and in open fields, which underlines the urgent need for low-cost water-borne sewage/drainage systems. “These facts about water supply and sanitary facilities explain the increasing diarrhoea in this area which leads to a prevalence of 40.2% for diarrhoea. Therefore, it can be stated that the sanitation practices in Bamiyan are unsafe which is probably a contributing factor to the high rate of sickness and deaths that are related to diarrhoeal disease.”³³ When it comes to school, the large majority of parents are willing to send their children to school. There is one boy’s high school in the centre of Bamiyan and one girl’s high school in Saidabad. Whereas the boy’s high school has a very central location, the girl’s school is less ideal. Consequently, villagers who are living in remote villages are reluctant to send their girls to school since the journey can take anything up to two hours.

4.3 DEVELOPMENT AT DIFFERENT PACES


³¹ Thomas Reineke, UNESCO consultat, interviewed in August 2005

³² For the exact figures for each village visit, see Annexe 2

³³ idem

Bamiyan city is composed of different types of villages. They have varying degrees of wealth and earn their income from different sources (cf. Figure 7). They do not benefit from the same access to public infrastructure. As a result, it is possible to draw up the following typology of the twelve villages identified as being part of Bamiyan city.

Figure 7: Sources of income of the villages of Bamiyan “city”



Source: the author based on an UNSECO map 2005, 2006

4.3.1 Rich agricultural villages in the south (Hyderabad, Said abad)

The richest villages are those where the big landowners live, that is to say Hyderabad (457 families) and Said abad (400 families). These two villages are among the most densely populated villages. Big landowners (between 10 and 20 jeribs of land)³⁴ are probably the category of the Bamiyan population that takes the best advantage of the development of the bazaar. Indeed, they are able to invest the profits generated from the land in new commercial activities. Hence they diversify their activities and have several sources of income. These two villages are located in the southern area and are surrounded with a wide expanse of farming land. These villages have also succeeded in irrigating their land using water sources originating from the Bobo mountains. Indeed in comparison with the villages located in the northern part of Bamiyan, these villages have a better access to both drinking and irrigation water.

³⁴ 1 jerib = 1/5 of one hectare

4.3.2 Rich villages linked with NGOs and government offices (Sarasyab, part of Mollah Ghollum, part of Gorwana)

The other rich village is Sarasyab, which is situated in the plateau next to the airstrip, where UN organisations and NGOs have their offices and guesthouses. It is also in this area that government offices are located (cf. Figure 7 and Figure 8). Many of the people living in this village work for NGOs, UN organisations and the government. They have a regular income and some even have several houses which they rent out to international organisations and NGOs. Many of them also have activities in the bazaar, such shop premises that they rent out. On top of this, they are also landowners. As for Saidabad and Hyderabad, the wealth of these inhabitants comes from their ability to diversify their incomes. In these villages it is also possible to find some livestock. Before the war, animal husbandry was the main activity in these villages but the people lost all their livestock during the war and since, very few have chosen to reinvest in this activity. Households tend to own just few sheep or cows for their own use.

4.3.3 Mixed villages (Gorwana, Dasht Essankhan, Taiboti)

In these three villages, the inhabitants either work in the fields or in the bazaar, or both. They are a mix of rich and poor villages. People are small landowners which means that the crops they grow are reserved to their own consumption. They do not grow enough to be able to sell the surplus. On the contrary, they often need to buy food to complete their home produce, especially during the winter. Some are able to run a small shop in the bazaar but the majority work as daily workers in the bazaar. The advantage of these villages is their location since they are situated in the fertile valley. They do not suffer from difficult access to water.

4.3.4 Expansion of poor villages, exclusively linked to an already saturated bazaar

The new villages that have sprung up are exclusively linked to the bazaar since all the newcomers are de facto landless. This is especially true given that there is no more agricultural land available today in Bamiyan area. They have no choice but to seek job opportunities in the bazaar yet there is not enough work in the bazaar for all these new workers. As a result, newcomers experience considerable difficulties in earning a regular income and therefore cannot afford decent accommodation. These poor villages illustrate all too well the changes Bamiyan “city” is experiencing today. The most vulnerable people settle in Zargarán and Shang Chespan. This population can be identified as a new “urban poor” since they have no link at all with farming land despite the fact that they are living very close to the fields. More than ever, the ability to have access to a piece of land to grow crops is a determining factor in household wealth. These villages have sprung up as a result of the expansion of the bazaar, yet the bazaar is not able to absorb this new “urban” population.

4.3.4.1 Who are the vulnerable ones today in Bamiyan and what are their vulnerabilities?

One can identify different criteria of vulnerability for the inhabitants of Bamiyan. The most vulnerable people are suffering from either one or more of the following problems: lack of income, lack of land, unemployment and food insecurity. Access to land is probably the most important factor of vulnerability. When a household does not own a small piece of land where they can grow wheat and vegetables, their capacity to get enough food for the family is weakened. Hence access to land also determines the degree of food security. The second factor linked to access to land is irregularity of income. Indeed a large part of the population in Bamiyan has no choice but to work as daily workers in the bazaar. Yet job opportunities in the bazaar are increasingly difficult to find, especially during the winter. Even during the

spring and the summer when the bazaar reaches its peak, most of the daily workers work only two or three times a week earning between 50 and 200 afghanis per day (between US\$1-4). Among the 66 vulnerable families interviewed, 21 household heads were unable to find any work and 24 were daily workers.

Another criterion that needs to be highlighted is where people live. Indeed people who are living in caves experience the hardest living conditions. All the caves are located in the poor villages on the side of the mountains. Either these people have always lived in caves because they had no money to build a house or they are IDPs who have lost their house during the war and do not have the money to rebuild it.

Another important criterion of vulnerability is widowhood. Indeed many men were killed during the war especially during the Taliban regime and most widows are unable to work. They also experience difficulties in finding a house if the family home was lost during the war or if the house is occupied by their husband's family. As a result they are totally dependant on the help of relatives and on job opportunities for their children. They survive thanks to the strong network of solidarity that exists in every village. Often the chief of the village helps the widows by giving them a house, some food, etc.

4.3.4.2 Coping strategies of the more vulnerable


Since the income of inhabitants in the poor villages is very irregular, they have no choice but to live on credit. Almost all the inhabitants have access to credit from relatives to cover their daily expenses or for building their house. It is important to stress that Afghan communities have a strong capacity to cope with adversity. Indeed strong solidarity networks exist among the family but also within the village. Taking out loans was found to be a major coping strategy used by those who are susceptible to hardship in winter. Families take a loan out to cover their daily expenses (food, clothes), for building their houses and, for those who are less vulnerable, for investing in a new commercial activity, such as buying a shop, a house, a car, etc. The majority of shopkeepers have access to credit between US\$500-1,000 from CHF (Community Habitat Finance) or AKDN.

Among the 66 vulnerable families interviewed, almost 56 families had taken out a loan at one point in their life. In contrast, among the rich families interviewed, a lower proportion is currently repaying a loan. Among the twelve rich families interviewed, only two had a loan to repay. Moreover, except for the shopkeepers who have access to loans from NGOs, the loans are almost always contracted with relatives or neighbours. Even if most people found it difficult to answer this question, it seems that these loans are interest free, or at least they were perceived as being costless by the families. Loans can be taken out for as much as 100,000 afghanis (US\$2,000). The most vulnerable families are also used to getting food on credit from shopkeepers in the bazaar, although this practice is very changeable and unsettling.

4.3.5 North-South divide

It needs to be highlighted that development in Bamiyan city is today taking place at different paces (cf. Figure 8). Clearly the location of the villages determines their access to water and to cultivable land. In this regard, the south and the middle area (villages located in the valley) have numerous advantages compared to the northern area. Hence, it is of no surprise that the poorest people and newcomers have no choice but to live in the northern area.

Figure 8: Development at different paces



Source: Author based on UNSECO map 2005, 2006

5 REASONS BEHIND CHANGE IN BAMİYAN SINCE 2001

The year 2001 was a significant changing point in Afghanistan's history. Indeed in 2001 the Taliban were defeated and US-led interventions began to overrun the country. When it comes to development in Bamiyan, this date is significant since it represents both a new start and an end to people's traditional livelihoods.

5.1 LIVELIHOODS CHANGED BECAUSE OF THE WAR

Before the war, people's livelihoods in Bamiyan were largely based on agriculture and livestock. During the war they experienced other livelihoods, especially people in exile. In Iran and Pakistan, young people went to high school and university, some of their parents worked in factories. On the whole, they experienced better living conditions. They were disappointed when they returned because rumours had spread that a real city was being developing in Bamiyan with lots of job opportunities. Likewise opportunities of accessing free land or cheap land turned out to be false.

Even for the population that did not take refuge abroad, livelihoods have changed. Indeed during the war, many people lost their livestock because of the drought and because of the Taliban.

5.1.1 Reasons why people no longer invest in livestock

There are several elements which explain why animal husbandry is on the decline. First, many people have not forgotten the traumas of the war and this continues to determine their livelihoods. People are still afraid that the Taliban may return. If they do not reinvest in livestock, it is because they are afraid of losing it again. More to the point, it is obvious that people who had shops before the war still have their shop and are able to make a good living from it today. On the other hand, people who had a lot of livestock before the war have lost everything and are unable to rebuild their wealth. Another reason for the decline in animal husbandry is that the current system of micro-credit³⁵ is not suitable for investing in livestock. Hence it is easier to get credit to invest in small businesses (shop, car, pump station) rather than in livestock due to the terms of the credit. Villagers have to reimburse their debt two months after they have received the loan, yet this is not enough time to make any profit from livestock. NGOs are reluctant to take the risk of giving loans to people who can reimburse only six or eight months later.

A third and final reason is the change in mentality. People are attracted to what they perceive as modern, that is to say in Bamiyan commercial activities: setting up a shop, buying a car, etc. Likewise livestock requires long-term investment and hard work whereas new businesses can generate decent amounts of money quickly. They are the symbol of a modern world and of a successful life in the eyes of a population who has suffered from 25 years of war. Indeed, it is worth raising the question whether in the long run the bazaar economy is going to completely overtake the rural economy?

As a result of these changes, the price of livestock has increased enormously. From the interviews conducted with butchers in Bamiyan bazaar, before the war a sheep cost 500 afghanis (US\$10), whereas today the price is 3000-5000 afghanis (US\$60-100). There is no longer a real livestock market in the bazaar, just a handful of people who bring a few sheep

³⁵ In Bamiyan, two NGOs, CHF and AKDN, provide loans to people in order to help them develop income generating activities.

or cows to sell. Consequently people eat less meat, and there are fewer butchers. Before the war, there were around 25 butchers in the bazaar and yet today only ten remain. Butchers are also finding it more difficult to source their supply of meat and have to travel to increasingly remote villages.

5.1.2 “Rich” people of Bamiyan are investing in new sectors

Inhabitants of the villages identified as part of Bamiyan city are investing their capital in new sectors and are specialising in what is perceived as ‘modern’ activities. This change is the result of several different factors. From what the villagers say one could understand the villagers would rather invest in activities they perceived as less fragile, that is to say commercial activities. Indeed among the eleven rich families interviewed, this change of approach for investing capital is very clear. Seven families were large livestock owners before the war (up to 2,000 sheep) but since the end of the war have chosen to invest the profits generated by their farming activities in commercial activities. This represents a radical change in people’s mentality and investing habits. Rich households no longer invest in livestock but in commercial activities. Indeed buying or renting a shop, opening a pump station, buying a car or a truck constitutes, according many people, a new and the best way of making money today in Bamiyan city. People are strongly attracted by what they perceive as being a modern way of life. There is one final issue that needs to be looked at: if activities in the bazaar become increasingly congested, it remains to be seen whether the development of the bazaar at this rate is sustainable in the long term. Among the eleven rich families interviewed, all the big landowners invested their profits from the sale of their crops (between 20,000 to 130,000 afghanis (US\$400-2,600) in buying a car and/or a truck for seven households, a pump station for two, a shop for five, building a new house in order to rent out their former home. Among the richest families interviewed, four had a job either at an international organisation or in local government. They all own their own house.

Some of the issues raised above are new and the direct aftermath of 25 years of war. One of the main consequences of the war is the severe impoverishment of the population. One should bear in mind that today all cattle owners lost their livestock during the war and only big landowners have the capacity to invest in new activities. Other households are unable to generate a new income and have no choice but to live on what they get from their land. Obviously, for those who have no land at all, their livelihoods are even more precarious.

5.2 BAMIYAN REPRESENTS A NEW AND SPECIFIC URBAN-RURAL INTERFACE

This mix between commercial and agricultural activities highlights the need to develop new ways of understanding the rural-urban interface and thus the true reality of Bamiyan today. Using a conventional or Western analysis in order to understand the differences between rural and urban areas may give rise to gross misunderstandings with regard to the Bamiyan reality. The categories used for defining cities and rural areas are no longer applicable. Indeed Bamiyan offers a very specific example of a new rural-urban linkage. It is still difficult to determine whether Bamiyan bazaar and its villages can truly be called a city. Bamiyan is in a transitional phase: it is no longer solely rural but it is not yet a city. Many people’s livelihoods are still based on agriculture although since the end of the war, they have shifted towards the growing economy of the bazaar. The bazaar is really the focal point of this area and today it determines the livelihoods of both the richest and the poorest. People who have enough money to invest in the bazaar are capable to generating a good income but for those who have no money to invest (daily workers), the bazaar does not offer good job opportunities. On the contrary, for the daily workers the bazaar is often responsible for a new ‘urban poverty’. It is worth paying attention to this change as it is likely to play an important role in the future development of Bamiyan.

6 WHAT TYPE OF DEVELOPMENT FOR BAMIYAN “CITY”? HOW TO PRESERVE THE HISTORICAL CITY WHILST PROMOTING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF A “MODERN” CITY?

When it comes to the future development of Bamiyan, several points of view and different people’s interests need to be taken into account. On the one hand, UNESCO is focusing its activities on preserving historical sites. On the other hand, local authorities headed by the governor are more interested in the economic and urban development of the city. And central to these diverging opinions are the inhabitants of Bamiyan whose points of view are rarely taken into account.

6.1 MANAGEMENT PLAN PRODUCED BY UNESCO

In 2004, UNESCO produced a management and conservation plan for archaeological and cultural areas in Bamiyan³⁶. This aspect cannot be reduced to the two giant Buddha holes, but also includes the 750 caves and the conservation of mural paintings³⁷ located in the area around the Buddhas, and also in surrounding valleys of Bamiyan and in Folady and Dukoney (cf. Figure 9). The aim of this plan is to identify the areas to protect and areas where urban development could be carried out without threatening the preservation of cultural sites. Recommendations for the future development of Bamiyan are based on this plan. It is worth highlighting that UNESCO’s intention was not to promote the building of a city but only to preserve archaeological and cultural areas. All the recommendations contained in the report were made on a conservation basis. These recommendations were published in December 2005 in Kabul³⁸. UNESCO has strongly underlined that it is entirely up to local authorities whether they implement these recommendations. Among these recommendations, UNESCO considers the need for provincial museums in Afghanistan and supports the establishment of a site-museum in Bamiyan in 2006. UNESCO points out that the educational role of a provincial museum is important not only for tourists but also for the local population. UNESCO also encourages the development of sustainable tourism through a Tourism Management Plan for the Bamiyan site, on condition that adequate participation of local stakeholders and of conservation-sensitive experts in its planning is ensured as part of an integrated regional development strategy. According to UNESCO this plan should be established by the end of 2006³⁹.


³⁶ *Protecting the world heritage site of Bamiyan, key issues for the establishment of a comprehensive Management plan*, UNESCO, 2004

³⁷ Centlivres, 2001

³⁸ Fourth Expert Working Group on the Preservation of the Bamiyan Site, Afghanistan, 7-10 December 2005, Kabul, Recommendations, UNESCO

³⁹ Fourth Expert Working Group on the Preservation of the Bamiyan Site, Afghanistan, 7-10 December 2005, Kabul, Recommendations, UNESCO

Figure 9: 2004 UNESCO Bamiyan map



Source: UNESCO, 2004

6.2 THE NEW GOVERNOR AND THE MASTER PLAN


The governor of Bamiyan saw UNESCO’s plan as an opportunity to develop a master plan for the construction of what she calls a “new city” on the plateau in the southern part of Bamiyan. The objectives of this master plan are to attract private investment, to receive financial resources from central government according to an agenda based on Bamiyan needs fixed by the master plan and finally to preserve the archaeological and historical zones (on UNESCO recommendations) by focusing all the investment in one area (on the plateau in the southern part), far away from the main cultural areas identified by UNESCO.

6.3 CONTENT OF THE MASTER PLAN

As yet no official master plan for Bamiyan has been published. Nevertheless several changes have already been proposed and are under discussion. From various interviews conducted with UNESCO, the governor and the Ministry of Urban Development and Housing, the list of changes they want implement includes:

- to freeze the development of the bazaar in the valley
- to strongly regulate the construction of buildings in the area close to the Buddhas
- to develop a residential area on the plateau
- to transfer administrative buildings currently on the plateau to a new location further south on the plateau (behind PRT base) and build more administrative buildings
- to develop tourist accommodation at the entry to the plateau (with a view of the Buddhas and mountains)
- to transfer the airport to Shibartoo

Figure 10: Proposed changes included in the Master Plan of Bamiyan city



Source: Author based on 2004 UNESCO map

One should bear in mind that this list is not official but the result of information gathered during August and October 2005. These changes will probably be updated in the near future. Indeed in its recommendations UNESCO “notes the full respect by the Ministry of Urban Development and Housing to the recommendations for the Bamiyan New Master Plan (rBNM) proposed by UNESCO” and recommends its legal adoption by the Afghan authorities for implementation. The contents of the rBNM ought to be effective at the latest by March 2006. More to the point UNESCO says they “endorse the formulation of a committee composed of the government authorities and technical experts as well as donors under the leadership of the governor of Bamiyan in order to implement the Bamiyan New Master Plan (BNM), as suggested by the Ministry of Urban Development and Housing”⁴⁰. The main issue remains that the overall budget for the construction of all these buildings has not yet been estimated or disclosed. More to the point, no one knows who is going to finance this work. It is clear that the Afghan authorities are unable to undertake such an investment since they do not have the necessary budget.

⁴⁰ Fourth Expert Working Group on the Preservation of the Bamiyan Site, Afghanistan, 7-10 December 2005, Kabul, Recommendations, UNESCO

6.4 FINDING A BALANCE BETWEEN CONSERVATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Protecting Bamiyan's heritage is a top priority for the governor to prevent any further deterioration. It is also essential for Bamiyan's future development. Indeed Bamiyan has a huge tourist potential. This being said, the need to establish a balance between conservation of the cultural landscape and economic development is even more important. Today stakeholders need to produce a plan that combines cultural and archaeological conservation and the right of Bamiyan inhabitants to have access to proper economic development. Yet a master plan needs a long-term development approach whereas the conservation of cultural and archaeological areas requires short-term immediate action. That is why what is needed today is a plan that combines cultural and archaeological conservation and a strategy to ensure that Bamiyan people benefit from economic development.


6.4.1 Development of the bazaar: a threat to the historical zones of Bamiyan

The continued expansion of the bazaar represents a threat to the historical sites, and this is why UNESCO recommended freezing the development of the bazaar in the valley. Nevertheless the majority of the shopkeepers do not agree with this strategy. Indeed shopkeepers who own their shops are afraid of losing their business if the bazaar is relocated on the plateau, which is the intention of the governor. Indeed if a new commercial area is created on the plateau, this will weaken the commercial area in the valley.

6.5 DEVELOPMENT OF THE TOURIST INDUSTRY?

Bamiyan has a huge tourist potential. During the sixties and seventies, Bamiyan was one of the main tourist attractions in Afghanistan and many young westerners visited Bamiyan. The presence of the Buddhas attracted many people. Today, even though the Buddhas have been destroyed, tourism is probably the best, or at least one of the best opportunities for development for Bamiyan area. Three hotels (cf. Figure 11) are located on the plateau and there are a few other low quality hotels in the bazaar. The plateau offers the best view of the Buddhas. The plateau is currently occupied by administrative buildings and has been identified by local authorities as an area where tourism infrastructure could be developed. In the bazaar, four shops are currently selling local handicraft. These shopkeepers would like to develop a bazaar specialised in handicraft, aimed especially at tourists. According to them, and they are some of the shopkeepers who make the most amount of money in the bazaar, there is a real potential for this type of activity, even if the number of tourists visiting the area remains quite low currently. Indeed Bamiyan itself is one of the more secure areas in Afghanistan, access throughout the rest of the country and travel safety remain low. Another example of the growing tourist industry in Bamiyan is that one year ago, fees were introduced for visiting the Buddha holes. Additionally, Bamiyan serves as a base for visiting other beautiful areas, such as the Band-I-amir Lakes situated two and a half hours by car on the west side of Bamiyan city.

Figure 11: Tourist potential in Bamiyan area



Source: Author, based on 2004 UNESCO map

7 IS BECOMING A CITY A SOLUTION TO BAMIIYAN'S PROBLEMS?

7.1 A MASTER PLAN DETACHED FROM REALITY IN BAMIIYAN

Firstly, it is important to establish that the master plan proposed by the governor seems to be completely detached from reality in Bamiiyan and from the city's problems. There is a real gap between the needs of the villagers and choices made by the local authorities. This gap is mainly due to the total lack of consultation of the local population in the process of design of the master plan. What the population wanted has not been taken into account, indeed no-one even bothered to ask them. As a result, the shopkeepers in the bazaar are threatening to refuse to leave or to have their shop relocated if a new commercial area were created in the plateau.

On top of this, the master plan focuses on only one zone, the plateau, which is already one of the richest areas. This raises the question of why the master plan is not being used as a means of developing the poorest villages first, since they are the ones who most urgently need infrastructure. The main issues that need addressing are that in the short run the master plan does not cover sanitation, electricity and access to water in the areas where they are the most needed, that is to say in the northern part. From what the local authorities say, the development of infrastructure in the northern part does not seem to be a top priority. They plan to work on it but only in five or six year's time. As a result, the master plan does not appear to resolve any of the people's problems or vulnerabilities. Only two villages are included in the master plan and they are among the richest in the area. The top priority of the master plan seems to be the development of a modern, urban area on the plateau. They want to build modern buildings for the administrative staff. The function of building this new area would be to attract private investment. They also want to build quality housing and a new commercial area. All of this infrastructure is aimed at the richest category of the population, those who have money to invest. Through the development of what the governor calls a "new city", she wants to project a new and modern image of Bamiiyan that will help to develop tourism. One should also bear in mind that the master plan was drawn up by engineers from Kabul.

Thus, there is a real danger that Bamiiyan will develop at two different speeds. Local stakeholders have clearly chosen a development approach to deal with Bamiiyan's issues. Nevertheless, in the northern villages of Bamiiyan, there is still a need of an emergency approach. This is why a master plan focused only on a development approach fails to respond fully to all of Bamiiyan's needs. Bamiiyan is in a transitional phase, where both emergency and development approaches are required. Thus, building a city is one way to deal with uncontrolled development issues but this is not enough: one should also take into account the needs of the more vulnerable populations.

Another concern that is raised by the master plan is lost opportunities in funding, time and goodwill this move may generate. Indeed this year, all building work around the bazaar has ceased since the governor wanted to wait until UNESCO produced its recommendations. But this year of standby has resulted in loss of funds, especially US funds. Indeed, USAID cancelled several projects because they were concerned by potential instability created by the master plan. They were afraid of investing money in an unstable political context since the intentions underlying the master plan were not clear at first. More to the point, USAID did not want to start building in an area when there was no guarantee that this work may continue in the near future.

7.2 WHY A MASTER PLAN? THE MYTH OF THE MODERN CITY

What is obvious today is the need for Bamiyan to establish a strategy for reigning in its uncontrolled expansion and development. Preserving the cultural landscape is as necessary as providing decent accommodation and infrastructure for the inhabitants of the area. Yet, is building a city the right solution as the local authorities seem to think?

There is a general consensus amongst both the villagers and the local authorities alike that an urban plan is necessary. This consensus is of consequence. Indeed it seems that everyone agrees that the development of a modern city remains the ultimate goal and a symbol of successful development. This is especially true for the population of Bamiyan who have experienced war and exile abroad. In this sense, building a city is also a way for the Hazara people who have experienced significant discrimination in the past to demonstrate that they are capable of promoting their own successful development. One may identify here some kind of irrational desire to expand which is not necessarily what the area needs or at least not at this speed. One has the feeling that for the people of Bamiyan, the city symbolises the solution to all their problems. The myth of the modern city is pervasive and shared by all the population, especially those who have returned from exile.

City development is part of any development process and it useless to try to fight against it. Yet what is decisive is the framework and the direction given to this process. It is clear that the hitherto uncontrolled development in Bamiyan needs a plan for guidance. Not all the stakeholders of Bamiyan are in agreement over the direction that development efforts should take (the population should be considered as a true stakeholder even if they have difficulties in expressing their needs). In this regard, another element that needs to be taken into account is the change in people's mentality, especially the youth who have experienced exile and no longer want to invest in agriculture. Although agriculture will not disappear, new activities are going to emerge. This process has already commenced and will probably only accelerate with time. In Bamiyan, urban and rural areas are not exclusive but complementary. This aspect deserves greater attention and provides a new image of the evolution of the rural and urban interface in Afghanistan. In this way, Bamiyan "city" is a symbol of a country currently trying to catch up with modernity and development.

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Annexe 1: List of interlocutors

<i>Name</i>	<i>Position / Organisation</i>
Abdorab (Dr)	Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD)
Engineer Ali	Finance manager – Shuhada organisation (local NGO)
Ahmad Naser	Mayor of Bamiyan city
Ahmed Sayed	Director of CCA (local NGO)
Anwary Said Kahmatulla	Head of the ministry of Refugees in Bamiyan
Anwazy Said Jalil	Director of NSCC
Atayee Ahmed Jawid	Administrator – UNICEF office in Bamiyan
Marie Santelli	Logistician - Solidarité
Braire Sophie	Head of agricultural program - Solidarité
Gnesdiloff Kira	USAID Representative in Bamiyan
Hairabadi (Dr)	Minister of Economy in Bamiyan
Hermes Simon	Head of office Bamiyan Regional office
Hussaini Habib	Head of office - ICRC
Iseminger Michelle	Head of sub-office of Bamiyan
Kisito Edouard	Technical coordinator – UNHCR office in Bamiyan
Kobayashi Hana	Gender/Community Development Advisor - JICA
Kowsary Abbas	Team leader - NRC
Kuhn Kristine	Relief, Recovery and Rehabilitation Officer
Matin Abdul	Engineer assistant – HCC (local NGO)
Mosavi Syed Jawad	Provincial director – AHRs (local NGO)
Engineer Nabi Said Akbar Mohammady	NSP team leader for the MRRD In charge of the communication of the « Islamic movement party » office of Bamiyan
Engineer Saoud	Head of office - CHF
Sarobi (Ms)	Governor of the province of Bamiyan
Reineke Thomas (Dr)	Geograph, UNESCO consultant
Roll Dominik	Engineer Architect, UNESCO consultant
Toubakis Georgios	Team leader - UNESCO
Timory Mahfooz	Engineer-Head of the Ministry of urban development and housing in Bamiyan
Ullah Ahmed	Assistant director of the construction company « Jada Abrishom »
Verjee Soraya	Field coordinator - AKDN
Yakamoto Shunsuke	Field Coordinator – Save the Children

Annexe 2: List of the villages visited and chiefs interviewed

First circle of villages visited and identified as being part of Bamiyan city

Name of the villages	Number of Families in 2005
Said abad	400
Hider abad	457
Sarasiab	380
Dasht Essan Khan	175
Jugra Khil	105
Zargaran	250
Daudi	210
Sang Chespan	105
Soghul	400
Mollah Ghollum	250
Gorwana	183
Taïboti	500

Population of Bamiyan city: 3,415 families, i.e. approximatively **20,490** people if one considers there is on average six members in each family.

Second circle of villages visited and chief interviewed (located in remote areas but still linked to the bazaar of Bamiyan)

Name of the villages	Number of Families
Fatmasti	100
Dukoney	480
Shashpul	200
No name, new refugees village	130
Khawl	210
Shawa Karna Takarif (Folady valley)	216
Tupchi	270
Shaidan	800
Tajek	285
Sokhdar	700

Annexe 3: Data collected among the more vulnerable people interviewed in the villages of Bamiyan city

Household criteria/villages	Zargaran	Hydrobad	Sarasyab	Mollah Ghollum	Saidabad	Shang Chespan	Dash Essankhan	Gorwana	Jugra Khil	Daudi	Soghul	Total
Refugees from Iran or Pakistan	1	4	2	4	2	0	0	0	1	0	1	15
originating from the village	3	6	2	0	7	0	4	6	3	4	1	36
Regular job (NGOs, governmental, teacher)	0	1	2	2	3	1	3	3	0	1	0	16
farmer	0	3	1	0	3	0	1	0	1	0	0	9
Irregular daily work in the bazar (50-150 afg/day)	4	2	0	3	1	2	0	1	0	2	2	17
Daily work either in the bazar either in the fields	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2
Irregular daily work in the fields	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	5
jobless	0	3	1	1	2	1	0	2	3	0	2	15
Land owner	0	3	2	0	6	0	4	3	3	3	0	24
Cattle owner (1-5 animals)	0	0	0	0	6	0	3	3	1	2	0	15
Credit (from relatives and /or shopkeeper)	5	7	5	3	10	3	4	5	5	5	4	56
Owner of the house they live in	5	5	2	4	4	2	4	6	5	4	1	42
latrine	5	4	1	6	4	4	5	2	4	3	1	39
Access to wheel/handpump	0	3	0	6	1	0	2	0	3	4	0	19
Donkey for water	1	2	1	0	5	4	3	2	0	4	1	23
electricity	0	4	2	2	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	13

